They are Nigeria’s first leadership eleven: the troika of Chief
Olusegun Obasanjo, Gen Ibrahim Babangida and Gen Abdulsalami Abubakar —
all of them retired army generals. The media was awash with reports they
met at Gen Babangida’s Hilltop residence in Minna, Niger State, on
Tuesday to deliberate on issues whose agenda were kept away from the
prying eyes of the public. They always seethed with schemes; but this
time their schemes were not quite as obvious to the public as reporters
would like them to be. Moreover, why only three of them met , out of
Nigeria’s seven living ex-heads of state, is difficult to fathom.
Perhaps it is only these three that have shown bravery in affecting, for
good or bad, the fortunes of Nigeria.
Speculations were rife on Tuesday that the meeting dwelled more on President Muhammadu Buhari’s delicate health and its implications for both governance and
stability. It was said that the three were loth to be taken by surprise, should the president succumb precipitately to the vagaries of poor health, especially with cabals poised dangerously in the wings to profit from the confusion. So far, the three former leaders have been uninterested in confirming the details of their meeting, whether it was principally to discuss President Buhari’s health in terms of its urgent dimensions, or whether it was to look in general terms at the post-Buhari era. Whatever the meeting was about, it held, and the troika confidently posed for a group photograph at the end to illustrate either their defiance or self-assurance.
Given the three leaders’ qualifications and general background, it is unlikely that Nigerians think the gentlemen possess the wherewithal to positively affect the future and destiny of Nigeria. The threesome always summoned the presumptuousness to tinker with Nigeria; but whether they have the qualifications to engender great and inspiring outcomes is a different thing altogether. In 1999, the three, together to some extent with former army chief, T.Y. Danjuma, determined the direction of Nigeria: what the constitution would look and sound like, and who should assume the presidency in the wake of MKO Abiola’s controversial death in government custody. In the end, pretending to some democracy, and with a constitution that was yet to be promulgated, it was decided that the traumatised Chief Obasanjo, who was just coming out of jail and the spectre of a death sentence, should assume power. The electorate merely became a rubber stamp.
While Generals Babangida and Abubakar were not involved in foisting the then sick Umaru Yar’Adua on the country in 2007, that bewildering choice was a substantial fulfilment of the designs and preferences of the troika. Since then, and without any hint of remorse whatsoever, the three generals have always had their way in determining who gets what. Indeed, even a section of the political class which attempted to muscle their way into the group to enthrone President Buhari, had had to worm or insinuate their way into the confidence of the troika. The three generals undoubtedly have an implacable hold on power in Nigeria.
In the past few years, the three generals have become even more
confident in meddling in the politics of who becomes president. In 2015,
they were deeply involved, perhaps Gen Babangida less so on account of
his health challenges. Chief Obasanjo, the usual battering ram of the
group, provided the casus belli in baiting and profiling the disfavoured
ex-president Goodluck Jonathan, and in softening the grounds for the
incoming President Buhari. If feelers from the Hilltop mansion meeting
are accurate, Chief Obasanjo appears poised to weigh in against the
weary and now reclusive President Buhari, an assignment that may not be
mitigated by President Buhari’s sudden appearance yesterday at the Aso
Villa mosque for Friday prayers. A few months ago, he had suggested that
the president’s economic management ability left much to be desired.
Now, some innuendoes are issuing from him concerning the president’s
disappearing and appearing acts.
Gen Babangida had hoped to profit from the precedence set by Chief Obasanjo, by contesting and retaking the president’s office in 2007. He failed. But despite that, he has sustained his interest in who takes the highest office in the land. In fact, during his about eight years in office, he had managed to create a myth around himself, a myth that has somehow endured, if not in vigor, for no one is willing or even interested in testing it, then at least in perseverance. His ‘boys’ may no longer be in the military; but who wants to find out? Perhaps the idea of his ‘boys’ being in the military, or the suspicion that officers loyal to what he stood for might still be in the military, is more than sufficient to sustain his political and leadership currency.
Gen Abubakar’s relevance rests mainly on two planks: his resolute and summary completion of a short transition programme between 1998 and 1999, about 11 months after assuming office; and the laudable role he played as leader of the National Peace Committee in the last presidential election to smoothen the change of baton from the more sensitive and fairly compliant Dr Jonathan to the more truculent and less amenable President Buhari. Gen Abubakar has sensibly, bravely but taciturnly persisted in safeguarding whatever unwritten agreements flowed from the work of his committee in those heady months leading to the last polls. His work and assiduousness, not to say being the least controversial of the troika, have combined to reinforce his relevance as a member of the musketeers.
If it is presumptuous of the three generals to take upon themselves the task of forging peace and amity in the country as well as midwifing who becomes president, it is a presumptuousness that is sadly anchored on nothing but a general belief that their names and positions qualify them to do so. Whether those qualifications are sufficient to enable them perform the thankless role of guardian angels, when a disciplined adherence to the constitution would otherwise be sufficient, is hard to say. Perhaps societies need such interventions; but if they do, it would be to the extent of the philosophical and ideological qualifications and convictions of the interventionists. In the case of the three musketeers, their interventions, whether in 1993 or 1999, or more gallingly in 2007, were based on private and entirely selfish considerations.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the continuing crisis Nigeria faces is essentially due to the needless, selfish and destructive interventions and manipulations sponsored by the three meddlesome ex-generals. Appreciating them for their contributions in the past few years must therefore be situated properly in the context of the damage they had occasioned in the past, near or distant. Had they allowed the system to run independently as it should, and had their contributions been altruistic as the country had hoped, Nigeria would have avoided the pestilential reign of Gen Sani Abacha, escaped the appalling ‘democratic’ foundations laid by Chief Obasanjo between 1999 and 2007, ducked the pillage masterminded by Dr Jonathan, and entirely circumvented the now lethargic and staid presidency of another ex-general, Buhari.
But much more damaging and hubristic is the arbitrary manner the three former generals and ex-heads of state have determined that no other former head of state or president is apparently qualified to join the so-called ‘first eleven’ and ‘patron saints’ of Nigerian leadership. By accident or design, and since 1993, none among the other former leaders have been invited to the conclave of schemers determining the fate of Nigeria. Ex-president Shehu Shagari has been largely ignored, and has himself not attempted to muscle his way into the group. He apparently has little say and no real locus standi. Little say, because no philosophy or ideology of society and leadership has been associated with him; and no locus because his presidency was stymied by such weariness of mind that few thought he was better than a cipher when he ruled.
Ex-head of state Yakubu Gowon remains probably the most moralistic of
all Nigeria’s former leaders, and the one who could boast of real or
substantial fame following his successful prosecution of the civil war
and the developmental programmes and projects his government emplaced.
But he is a man full of caution, pawky caution, and he is distant,
sometimes patrician, somewhat unobtrusive, and now more sermonising, if
not outrightly proselytizing. Such a man could not be inducted into a
caucus of schemers and intriguers, nor get him to offend or undermine
his Christian principles and conscience. The three generals will not
invite Ernest Shonekan, the interim president who by military decree
became a former head of state, into anything, so help them God. As for
Dr Jonathan, why, the wounds are still very fresh, searing and palpable
to allow him rub shoulders with the three ex-generals.
For as long as the country permits them, the three generals will continue to meddle in the country’s leadership politics. They will hardly suggest anything deep, engaging and ideological about the economy, politics and society. These concepts addle their brains. What obsesses them is leadership, partly because of the benefits which that brings, the itch to run things, and the power and visibility involved. Do they possess the wisdom to scheme right? The jury is out on that. If they had the ability to see far into the future, they would not have schemed the country into its present cul-de-sac. So, unable to see into the distant, they will intrigue for the short run, insist on the conservatism and fearful caution that blighted their own leadership, and place themselves appropriately to remain influential and to be heard and seen. The three musketeers, this restrictive ‘first eleven’ scripting Nigeria’s unfolding tragedy, can’t do more than they are really and clearly capable of.
Ref: http://thenationonlineng.net/three-musketeers-scheme/
Speculations were rife on Tuesday that the meeting dwelled more on President Muhammadu Buhari’s delicate health and its implications for both governance and
stability. It was said that the three were loth to be taken by surprise, should the president succumb precipitately to the vagaries of poor health, especially with cabals poised dangerously in the wings to profit from the confusion. So far, the three former leaders have been uninterested in confirming the details of their meeting, whether it was principally to discuss President Buhari’s health in terms of its urgent dimensions, or whether it was to look in general terms at the post-Buhari era. Whatever the meeting was about, it held, and the troika confidently posed for a group photograph at the end to illustrate either their defiance or self-assurance.
Given the three leaders’ qualifications and general background, it is unlikely that Nigerians think the gentlemen possess the wherewithal to positively affect the future and destiny of Nigeria. The threesome always summoned the presumptuousness to tinker with Nigeria; but whether they have the qualifications to engender great and inspiring outcomes is a different thing altogether. In 1999, the three, together to some extent with former army chief, T.Y. Danjuma, determined the direction of Nigeria: what the constitution would look and sound like, and who should assume the presidency in the wake of MKO Abiola’s controversial death in government custody. In the end, pretending to some democracy, and with a constitution that was yet to be promulgated, it was decided that the traumatised Chief Obasanjo, who was just coming out of jail and the spectre of a death sentence, should assume power. The electorate merely became a rubber stamp.
While Generals Babangida and Abubakar were not involved in foisting the then sick Umaru Yar’Adua on the country in 2007, that bewildering choice was a substantial fulfilment of the designs and preferences of the troika. Since then, and without any hint of remorse whatsoever, the three generals have always had their way in determining who gets what. Indeed, even a section of the political class which attempted to muscle their way into the group to enthrone President Buhari, had had to worm or insinuate their way into the confidence of the troika. The three generals undoubtedly have an implacable hold on power in Nigeria.
Gen Babangida had hoped to profit from the precedence set by Chief Obasanjo, by contesting and retaking the president’s office in 2007. He failed. But despite that, he has sustained his interest in who takes the highest office in the land. In fact, during his about eight years in office, he had managed to create a myth around himself, a myth that has somehow endured, if not in vigor, for no one is willing or even interested in testing it, then at least in perseverance. His ‘boys’ may no longer be in the military; but who wants to find out? Perhaps the idea of his ‘boys’ being in the military, or the suspicion that officers loyal to what he stood for might still be in the military, is more than sufficient to sustain his political and leadership currency.
Gen Abubakar’s relevance rests mainly on two planks: his resolute and summary completion of a short transition programme between 1998 and 1999, about 11 months after assuming office; and the laudable role he played as leader of the National Peace Committee in the last presidential election to smoothen the change of baton from the more sensitive and fairly compliant Dr Jonathan to the more truculent and less amenable President Buhari. Gen Abubakar has sensibly, bravely but taciturnly persisted in safeguarding whatever unwritten agreements flowed from the work of his committee in those heady months leading to the last polls. His work and assiduousness, not to say being the least controversial of the troika, have combined to reinforce his relevance as a member of the musketeers.
If it is presumptuous of the three generals to take upon themselves the task of forging peace and amity in the country as well as midwifing who becomes president, it is a presumptuousness that is sadly anchored on nothing but a general belief that their names and positions qualify them to do so. Whether those qualifications are sufficient to enable them perform the thankless role of guardian angels, when a disciplined adherence to the constitution would otherwise be sufficient, is hard to say. Perhaps societies need such interventions; but if they do, it would be to the extent of the philosophical and ideological qualifications and convictions of the interventionists. In the case of the three musketeers, their interventions, whether in 1993 or 1999, or more gallingly in 2007, were based on private and entirely selfish considerations.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the continuing crisis Nigeria faces is essentially due to the needless, selfish and destructive interventions and manipulations sponsored by the three meddlesome ex-generals. Appreciating them for their contributions in the past few years must therefore be situated properly in the context of the damage they had occasioned in the past, near or distant. Had they allowed the system to run independently as it should, and had their contributions been altruistic as the country had hoped, Nigeria would have avoided the pestilential reign of Gen Sani Abacha, escaped the appalling ‘democratic’ foundations laid by Chief Obasanjo between 1999 and 2007, ducked the pillage masterminded by Dr Jonathan, and entirely circumvented the now lethargic and staid presidency of another ex-general, Buhari.
But much more damaging and hubristic is the arbitrary manner the three former generals and ex-heads of state have determined that no other former head of state or president is apparently qualified to join the so-called ‘first eleven’ and ‘patron saints’ of Nigerian leadership. By accident or design, and since 1993, none among the other former leaders have been invited to the conclave of schemers determining the fate of Nigeria. Ex-president Shehu Shagari has been largely ignored, and has himself not attempted to muscle his way into the group. He apparently has little say and no real locus standi. Little say, because no philosophy or ideology of society and leadership has been associated with him; and no locus because his presidency was stymied by such weariness of mind that few thought he was better than a cipher when he ruled.
For as long as the country permits them, the three generals will continue to meddle in the country’s leadership politics. They will hardly suggest anything deep, engaging and ideological about the economy, politics and society. These concepts addle their brains. What obsesses them is leadership, partly because of the benefits which that brings, the itch to run things, and the power and visibility involved. Do they possess the wisdom to scheme right? The jury is out on that. If they had the ability to see far into the future, they would not have schemed the country into its present cul-de-sac. So, unable to see into the distant, they will intrigue for the short run, insist on the conservatism and fearful caution that blighted their own leadership, and place themselves appropriately to remain influential and to be heard and seen. The three musketeers, this restrictive ‘first eleven’ scripting Nigeria’s unfolding tragedy, can’t do more than they are really and clearly capable of.
Ref: http://thenationonlineng.net/three-musketeers-scheme/
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